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Anti-Discrimination Law-SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND BATrERY: MUTU-
ALLY EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES FOR INDEPENDENT HARMS-Wirig v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990)
"Sexual harassment ... is not about sex. If someone were to kill
another person with a rolling pin, we would not consider it
cooking."'
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Sexual harassment is an assertion of power. Sexual harassment in
employment promotes the belief that a woman's sexuality is valued
above her role as a contributing worker. Sexual harassment is dis-
crimination with the purpose and effect of keeping women in their
historical positions as persons able to change their circumstances
only by trading on their sexuality. 2 This socially imposed incon-
1. Taylor, How to Avoid Taking Sexual Harassment Seriously: A New Book that Perpe-
trates Old Myths (Book Review), 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 673, 675 (1981) (reviewing M.
MEYER, I. BERCrroLD, J. OESTREICH, & F. COLLINS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1981)).
Sexual harassment is the use of sex as an instrument of domination, and may take the
form of verbal abuse, indecent suggestions, propositions, requests for sexual favors,
demands for intercourse, physical touching and rape. Id.
2. Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345, 362 (1980). Until courts recognize the discrimina-
tory impact of sexual harassment in the workplace, they will lack an adequate basis
1
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gruity between the role of worker and the role of woman may be the
quintessential discriminatory stereotype.S
Sexual harassment is perpetuated by the enduring belief that sex-
ual innuendo at work is "both natural to men and flattering to wo-
men."4 Pervading the workplace is the maxim that "there's no harm
in asking." While it is widely acknowledged that racial slurs in the
workplace are intolerable, offensive and probably illegal, references
to a woman's sex or sexuality are tolerated as "human nature." 5
Sexual harassment on the job places tremendous barriers on wo-
men's road to economic and social equality. Victims are forced into
the untenable dilemma of either acceding to a hostile work environ-
ment, or suffering the consequences. One option promises contin-
ued harassment, blows to self-worth and professional reputation,
and possible physical harm. The second option engenders dismissal,
lost promotions or lost benefits. Either choice affirms stereotypes
that women, absent sexuality, are powerless.
Sexual harassment covers an expansive range of physical and ver-
bal contact which takes many forms and is pervasive in all employ-
ment arenas. 6 Women are two and one half times more likely to be
harassed by supervisors than their male colleagues. A study of fed-
eral employees published several years ago revealed that forty-two
percent of 694,000 women and fifteen percent of 1,168,000 men said
they had experienced some form of sexual harassment. 7
for resolving the scope of conduct to be proscribed and the extent of employer liabil-
ity. Id.
3. See id. at 361-62. Discriminatory behavior in the workplace reminds women
of this incongruity and can interfere with their job performances. As a result, women
are often seen as persons less capable than men of performing demanding tasks. Id.
4. Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under Title Vlfor Sexual Harassment by Supervisory
Employees, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 499, 504 (1981) (citing L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN:
THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 12-13, 183-84 (1978)).
5. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977). "We are not here
concerned with racial epithets... which serve no one's interest, but with social pat-
terns that to some extent are normal and expectable. It is the abuse of the practice,
rather than the practice itself, that arouses alarm." Id.
6. See generally Dolkart & Malchow, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Expanding
Remedies, 23 TORT & INS. LJ. 181, 181-82 (1987) (setting forth examples of typical
sexual harassment scenarios and their results, such as loss of economic benefits and
work in a hostile and offensive environment).
7. Vermeulen, supra note 4, at 505 n.32 (citing U.S. MERIT Svs. PROTECTION BD.
OFF. OF MERIT Sys. OF REV. & STUDIES, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORK-
PLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 35 (Mar. 1981)). In 1987, a similar study of federal employ-
ees was done revealing virtually identical results as the study done over six years
earlier: 42% of the female employees and 14% of the men still complained of being
sexually harassed in the workplace. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD. OFF. OF POL'Y &
EVALUATION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 16
(1988).
A recently published poll found that one in four of the 803 people surveyed had
[Vol. 17
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT
For over two decades, sexual harassments in employment has been
deemed a form of gender discrimination9 in violation of both federal
and state antidiscrimination laws.O At their inception, state I and
experienced some form of prejudice on the job. Among the types of discrimination
reported, gender bias was the most frequently mentioned. The National Law Jour-
nal, July 16, 1990 at 1; see also Hodgdon, Fighting Sexual Harassment 9 to 5, LAw &
PoLrrcs, Feb. 1991, at 16 (reporting that 85% of working women say they have
experienced sexual harassment, with 15% having experienced severe harassment or
physical assault).
"The phenomenon [of sexual harassment] is so widespread precisely because
there is nothing socially or psychologically remarkable about the men who practice
it." Id. A 1988 survey of 13 schools in the St. Paul-Minneapolis metropolitan area
found that 80% of the students considered sexual harassment "prevalent" within
their schools. Tanick, Bedbugs, LAW & PoLmcs, Feb. 1991, at 19.
8. Any definition of sexual harassment is forced to encompass a wide spectrum
of behavior. The term is defined as "sexual pressure imposed on someone who is
not in an economic position to refuse it." C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103
(1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. More simply, sexual harassment is "the
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of une-
qual power." C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENTr OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).
Such behavior can range from staring at, commenting upon or touching a woman's
body, to demands for sexual intercourse and rape. Vermeulen, supra note 4, at 499.
For an interesting historical perspective on sexual harassment, see Goodman,
Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10
CAP. U.L. REV. 445 (1981) (Although the legal system, in responding to "changes in
the political climate and popular conceptions," has recognized a cause of action for
gender discrimination, substantial developments in the law will only occur through
changes in the fundamental relations between the sexes.).
9. Men can also be victims of sexual harassment. This Note's focus on sexual
harassment of women by men is not intended to suggest otherwise.
10. Sexual harassment cases differ from more readily understood discrimination
cases. MacKinnon writes:
To hold that a woman target of unwanted heterosexual advances would not
be in that position if she were not a woman is both the point and very differ-
ent from requiring a plaintiff to prove that she was victimized as a woman
because a man made sexual advances to her meaning to discriminate against
women.
MacKinnon, Introduction, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. i, v (1981).
Sexual harassment has a dual nature. It is class-based discrimination enforced
by individual victimization. Id at iv. Frequently, gender-based inequality is enforced
by patronizing or profit-motivated acts which are no less denigrating or damaging
because they lack a tangible discriminatory motivation. The intent to discriminate
should not be an element of sexual harassment. Id at v.
Gender discrimination occurs when women are generally paid lower wages than
men, or, as a rule, are promoted at a slower rate than men. These are examples of
discrimination that courts will impute to the employer and will punish. It may be
much more difficult, however, to prove harassment of a single or small number of
employees than to show a general trend of discrimination. All sexual harassment is
gender discrimination; not all gender discrimination is sexual harassment.
The acceptance of sexual harassment as gender-based discrimination acknowl-
edges that sexual initiatives which men may perceive as acceptable and normal sex-
role behavior are, in fact, damaging to women. From one male perspective, no harm
occurred if none was intended. See id. at ii. Balancing this harm with the absence of
1991]
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federall2 statutes provided victims with some recourse. Now, these
statutes provide victims with a comprehensive remedy for sexual har-
assment and other forms of gender discrimination.
Victims of sexual harassment have historically chosen to bring
any valid business, governmental or societal purpose to the practice of sexual harass-
ment tips the scale in favor of eliminating the damaging behavior. MacKinnon be-
lieves that "[tihe existence of a neutral ground between women's and men's
perspectives on sexual issues, and the proper posture of the law, depend upon the
relation between the sexes, the role of sexuality in work.., and a theory of the state
[opposing sexual harassment]." Id. at iii.
11. In 1969, the Minnesota Legislature amended the Act Against Discrimination
by adding prohibitions against gender-based discrimination in employment. See Act
approved June 6, 1969, ch. 975, 1969 Minn. Laws 1938 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1 (1990)). The 1969 amendment obligated employers,
employment agencies and labor unions to refrain from such discrimination, giving
Minnesotans an alternative to actions based on Title VII. Id. The State Act Against
Discrimination is now the Minnesota Human Rights Act. MINN. STAT. ch. 363 (1990).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Title VII states in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission created guidelines on sexual
harassment for the benefit of federal courts and others grappling with the somewhat
vague language of Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). Section 1604.11 of the
EEOC guidelines states in pertinent part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejec-
tion of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harass-
ment, the [Human Rights] Commission will look at the record as a whole
and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court, although not bound to follow the administrative agency's
definitions, for all practical purposes chooses to do so. See General Elec. Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)) (The EEOC guidelines "constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."); see generally
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claims under state or federal discrimination statutes while simultane-
ously bringing claims under other theories. Plaintiffs often raised
parallel claims because Title VII and earlier versions of the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act (MHRA) were interpreted to authorize only
equitable remedies.13 The MHRA currently allows recovery of com-
pensatory damages up to three times the amount of actual damages,
punitive damages (capped at $8,500), damages for mental anguish,
attorney's fees and a civil penalty. ' 4 Such recovery is limited to dam-
ages resulting from discrimination, including those resulting from
sexual harassment. Such recovery is not excessive in light of the
damaging and pervasive nature of the wrongful act.15
Still, remedies under the MHRA were not intended to, and cannot,
adequately compensate victims of torts such as battery. Neverthe-
less, in Win'g v. Kinney Shoe Corp. ,16 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a woman who was battered in an environment charged with
sexual harassment is not entitled to damages for that battery, but is
limited to the remedies provided by the MHRA.17
The Wirig court interpreted the exclusive remedy clause of the
MHRA18 to allow parallel battery claims, and then crippled such ac-
tions by disallowing parallel damage recovery. As a result, Wirig will
change the way that sexual harassment claims are litigated in
Minnesota.
This Note examines the Minnesota Human Rights Act as it relates
to sexual harassment in employment. This Note will also examine
the remedies currently available under the MHRA and the future
consequences of the Wirig decision. The history of the MHRA, legis-
lative intent, and rudimentary legal principles all support the
supreme court's decision to allow battery claims in sexual harass-
ment litigation-but there is no support for the court's exclusion of
damages in those actions.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (Title VII allows courts to award a victori-
ous plaintiff reinstatement, backpay or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.).
Early versions of the Minnesota Anti-Discrimination Act allowed the issuance of
cease and desist orders, and orders "to take such affirmative action as in the judg-
ment of the commissioner will effectuate the purposes of" the Act. See MINN. STAT.
§ 363.07, subd. 4 (1965) repealed by Act effective July 1, 1967, ch. 897, § 29, 1967
Minn. Laws 1950. The Act did not specify what constituted affirmative action.
14. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990).
15. See generally FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 8, at 47-55 (discussing studies
by Working Women United Institute and Redbook showing physical as well as emo-
tional effects of women who have experienced harassment).
16. 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990).
17. Id. at 377-79.
18. MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1990).
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I. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Minnesota Human Rights Act
The MHRA has been evolving into its present state for nearly fifty
years.19 Prohibitions against gender-based discrimination are sur-
prisingly recent,2 0 yet the Act as it now stands, is a relatively compre-
hensive piece of legislation. The MHRA secures freedom from
gender-based discrimination in employment. This freedom is effec-
tuated by allowing aggrieved parties to bring administrative or dis-
trict court actions against perpetrators of gender discrimination.
2 '
19. See Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimina-
tion and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A Comparative Analy-
sis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 231 (1967). In 1943, Governor EdwardJ. Thye
created the Governor's Interracial Commission. Id. at 232 n.2. In 1955, Governor
Orville Freeman created the Governor's Commission on Human Rights. The State
Commission Against Discrimination was created in 1961 by amendment to the State
Fair Employment Practices Commission. The State Act Against Discrimination was
passed in 1965. Id. at 231. In 1967, the Minnesota Legislature amended the State
Act Against Discrimination, creating a new Department of Human Rights in order to
replace the State Commission Against Discrimination as an administrative agency
and to assume the duties of the Governor's Commission of Human Rights and the
Governor's Commission on the Status of Women. Id. at 231-32.
20. The 1969 amendments to the Act were the first to add gender to the list of
protected classes. Act approved June 6, 1969, ch. 975, § 3, 1969 Minn. Laws 1937,
1938 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1990)).
When the Minnesota Legislature amended the Act in 1967, they looked to the
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibited em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Auerbach, supra note 19, at 232 (emphasis added) (citing NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL ANTi-DIsCRIMINA-
TION AcT (1966)). However, the Legislature's amendments prohibited discrimina-
tion only on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion or national origin." See Act
approved May 25, 1967, ch. 897, § 12, 1967 Minn. Laws 1932, 1934 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1). Only the Model Act's reference to sex
was eliminated; thus, gender discrimination was not prohibited. Auerbach, supra
note 19, at 245-46.
This exclusion was supported by educated members of the bar. See Miller, Sex
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 881
(1967). Miller wrote:
The sharp contrast between constitutional doctrines in the areas of sex
and racial classifications must be considered as a relevant factor by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in interpreting Title VII. The
growing and well-defined national policy that a man should be measured by
his individual worth, with his race regarded as an irrelevancy, points the way
for the Commission in that area. Hence, a vigorous application of a law
banning discrimination in employment against individuals on the basis of
race is justified.
Just as clearly, our national policy with respect to equality for women
has not been aimed at the same goal. Conceding that women are or should
be entitled to the same rights as men with respect to citizenship, few foresee or hope
for a day when a person will be viewed as an individual without regard to sex.
Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
21. See MINN. STAT. § 363.06, subd. 1(2) (1990) (grievances filed with the Depart-
(Vol. 17
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Section 363.03 of the Minnesota Statutes states that, unless based
on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is unfair for an employer,
because of gender:
(a) to refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which
unreasonably excludes a person seeking employment; or
(b) to discharge an employee; or
(c) to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or priv-
ileges of employment.2 2
The 1982 amendments to the MHRA added sexual harassment to
the definition of discrimination:23
"Sexual harassment" includes unwelcome sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or
other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual na-
ture when:
(1) submission to that conduct or communication is made a
term or condition, either explicitly or implicitly, of ob-
taining employment... ;
(2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or communica-
tion by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affect-
ing that individual's employment... ; or
(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect
of substantially interfering with an individual's employ-
ment ... ; and in the case of employment, the employer
knows or should know of the existence of the harassment
and fails to take timely and appropriate action.24
B. Legal Theories of Sexual Harassment
Two legal theories of sexual harassment have been applied by
courts and analyzed by scholars: quid pro quo sexual harassment and
hostile or offensive environment sexual harassment.25 Both subject
employers to liability under federal and state law.
Quid pro quo 26 sexual harassment occurs when "submission to sex-
ment of Human Rights); MINN. STAT. § 363.14 (1990) (civil actions by private
parties).
22. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1990).
23. Act approved March 23, 1982, ch. 619, § 2, 1982 Minn. Laws 1508, 1511
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 10a (1990)). The term "dis-
criminate" includes "segregate or separate and, for purposes of discrimination based
on sex, it includes sexual harassment." MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 10 (1990).
24. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 10 (1990).
25. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (1984) (drawing distinctions between quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment); see also Continental Can Co. v. State, 297
N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. 1980) (The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized an action
for hostile environment sexual harassment under the MHRA.).
26. "Quid pro quo" is defined as: "What for what; something for something.
Used in law for the giving one valuable thing for another. It is nothing more than the
1991]
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ual conduct is made a condition of concrete employment benefits."27
Victims of this type of sexual harassment are explicitly or implicitly
forced to choose between "acceding to sexual demands and forfeit-
ing job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or otherwise
suffering tangible job detriments."28 To establish a quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment claim, a plaintiff must prove the following elements
as a part of the prima facie case:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected group.
(2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex.
(4) the employee's reaction to the harassment complained of af-
fected tangible aspects of the employer's compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.... [and]
(5) Respondeat superior. 29
In order to rebut a prima facie case in a quid pro quo action, the
employer must show some legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for
the termination or change in employment circumstances. The plain-
tiff can overcome this rebuttal by showing that the motive offered by
mutual consideration which passes between the parties to a contract, and which ren-
ders it valid and binding." BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
Quidpro quo sexual harassment also may provide a cause of action to employees
other than the victim. The EEOC guidelines suggest that an employer may be liable
for gender discrimination to applicants who were denied a position, for which they
were qualified, or employment benefits because the position or employment benefits
were given to another in exchange for submission to sexual demands. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(g) (1990).
Albeit rare, a few courts have heard reverse quidpro quo claims. See, e.g., DeCintio
v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (Male em-
ployees failed to establish prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII when
supervisor hired paramour rather than promoting plaintiffs.); King v. Palmer, 778
F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Prima facie case established by showing that less
qualified employee, who was having sexual relations with the individual partially re-
sponsible for making promotions, was promoted over better qualified plaintiff.); Tos-
cano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (Supervisor promoted
employee who had submitted to his demands for sex instead of promoting plaintiff.).
27. Jones v. Wesco Inv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Hall v.
Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988)).
28. Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
1986) (Plaintiff failed to prove a cause of action in quid pro quo sexual harassment
where plaintiff induced the alleged harassment and offered insufficient evidence of
retaliation.).
29. Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 417 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
The issue of notice is hotly debated. See generally, Note, Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the Imposition of Liability Without Notice: A Progressive Approach to Tradi-
tional Gender Roles and Power Based Relationships, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 917 (1990) (en-
couraging the imposition of liability without notice); see also Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (the first case to impose vicarious liability for
quid pro quo sexual harassment without notice to the employer). Closer examination
of notice requirements is beyond the scope of this Comment.
[Vol. 17
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the employer was merely pretext for a discriminatory motive.30
Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when "an employer
create[s] or condone[s] a substantially discriminatory work environ-
ment, regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any tan-
giblejob benefits as a result of the discrimination."31 Requiring an
employee to endure sexual harassment while working inflicts dispa-
rate, discriminatory treatment on that employee, and is prohibited3 2
A plaintiff proceeding under a hostile environment theory must meet
elements substantially similar to those listed above regarding quidpro
quo harassment.3s
C. Damages under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
The MHRA, like its federal counterpart, Title VII, provides for re-
covery of back pay, reinstatement, injunctive relief, attorneys fees
and costs. 3 4 The Minnesota Legislature modelled the MHRA after
30. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting forth
the three-part burden-shifting analysis); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897 (11 th Cir. 1982) (model for the Supreme Court McDonnell Douglas test).
Minnesota courts must apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis in actions brought
under the MHRA. See Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720-21 (Minn.
1986); see also Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1978) (adopting of the three-
part McDonnell Douglas analysis).
31. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (Firm's discriminatory service toward Hispanic clients created a discriminatory
work environment for its Hispanic employees.).
32. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir. 1982); see also
Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) (The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted the hostile environment theory and the test set out in
Henson.).
33. The Henson court identified the elements necessary to establish a prima facie
case of hostile work environment harassment:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group ... ;
(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment .... In
order to constitute harassment, this conduct must be unwelcome in the
sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that
the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive....
(3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex. ... In proving a
claim for hostile work environment due to sexual harassment, there-
fore, the plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would
not have been the object of harassment....
(4) The harassment complained of affected a 'term, condition, or privilege'
ofemployment.... [The sexual harassment] must be sufficiently perva-
sive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment ....
(5) Respondeat Superior .... The employer knew, or should have known,
of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial
action.
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982) (citations and foot-
notes omitted).
34. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990). In a case involving discrimination in
employment, the 'judge may order the hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of an ag-
1991]
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Title VII.55 Consequently, decisions interpreting Title VII justify
similar treatment under the MHRA.36 However, the MHRA is far
more comprehensive than Title VII because it provides for recovery
of treble damages, punitive damages, damages for mental anguish
and suffering, in addition to payments for civil penalties.37
The MHRA sets no guidelines for treble damage awards.38 It
merely states: "In all cases where the judge finds ... an unfair dis-
criminatory practice, the ... judge shall order... compensatory dam-
ages in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained."' 9
The MHRA caps punitive damages at $8,500.40 These damages
are awarded pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.20.41 This section cur-
rently requires a showing of "deliberate disregard" for the rights or
grieved party.... with or without back pay, admission or restoration to membership
in a labor organization .... or any other relief the ... judge deems just and equita-
ble." Id. § 363.071, subd. 2(a).
Standard equitable remedies, such as the ones noted above are insufficient to
compensate victims:
[S]tandard equitable remedies, such as backpay and reinstatement, provide
no compensation to a plaintiff who has not quit or been fired from her job.
Moreover, the issuance of an injunction cannot compensate a plaintiff who
remains on the job for the abuse she has already suffered. Thus, whether an
employee stays on the job or leaves, her personal injuries such as her
anguish, her physical symptoms of stress, her sense of degradation and hu-
miliation, and the cost of her psychiatric or psychological care will remain
uncompensated if she relies solely on Title VII.
Dolkart & Malchow, Senual Harassment in the Workplace: Expanding Remedies, 23 TORT &
INS. LJ. 181, 189 (1987).
35. See Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978) (The language of
Title VII is "remarkably similar" to that of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 363, and Title
VII principles are applied in construing Minnesota Statutes Chapter 363.); Hubbard
v. United Press Int'l., Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441 (Minn. 1983) (Because of the sub-
stantial similarities in the language and purpose of Title VII and the MHRA, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has applied principles developed in the adjudication of
claims arising under Title VII in construing the MHRA.).
36. See Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 399; Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 441.
37. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990).
38. See generally Melsha v. Wickes Cos., Inc., 459 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (doubling actual compensatory damages of $31,602 to give victim "ade-
quate redress" when no punitive damages were awarded); Maeser v. North Star
Dodge Center, Inc., No. CO-90-131 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
Judge Short dissented in Maeser because the trial court trebled the back pay
award. She viewed the trial court's use of section 363.071 as an attempt to circum-
vent the punitive damages cap. Judge Short described the legislative intent behind
the statute as victim restoration and not perpetrator punishment. Id. (Short, J.,
dissenting).
39. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990) (emphasis added).
40. The statute now reads, in part: "In all cases the administrative law judge may
also order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination,
damages for mental anguish or suffering and reasonable attorney's fees, in addition
to punitive damages in an amount not more than $8,500." Id.
41. Id. § 549.20.
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safety of others.42 When Wirig was decided, however, the standard
was one of willful indifference.4 3 Damages for mental anguish are
not limited by Minn. Stat. § 363.071.44
Section 363.071 mandates the imposition of civil penalties, but
gives a judge discretion in determining the amount of such penal-
ties.45 This section instructs that the amount should be determined
by "taking into account the seriousness and extent of the violation,
the public harm occasioned by the violation, whether the violation
was intentional, and the financial resources of the respondent."4 6
Despite the plenary nature of the MHRA, claimants have tradition-
ally brought parallel tort claims to compensate for nondiscriminatory
harm.47 Claimants most frequently utilized battery, assault and emo-
tional distress as parallel theories.48
42. Id This section also provides a list of factors for courts to examine. It reads
in pertinent part:
Punitive damages shall be allowed... only upon clear and convincing evi-
dence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indifference for the rights
or safety of others.... Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by
those factors which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, in-
cluding the seriousness of hazard to the public .... the profitability of the
misconduct .... the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it,
the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its excessive-
ness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the mis-
conduct, the number and level of employees involved in causing or
concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of the defendant, and the
total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as
a result of the misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damages
awards to the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, and the severity
of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be subject.
Id. § 549.20.
43. With regard to the defamation claim, the court held that Kinney's public fir-
ing of Wirig without an investigation rose to the level of gross negligence, but not to
the level of willful indifference, the standard necessary to award punitive damages.
See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 381 (Minn. 1990). The punitive
damages standard employed by the court has since been modified to a standard of
"deliberate disregard." Act approved Aug. 1, 1990, ch. 555, § 15, 1990 Minn. Laws
1563 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1(a) (1990)).
44. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990).
45. Id. The language of the statute, "[t]he... judge shall order any respondent
found to be in violation of [this] section ... to pay a civil penalty to the state,"
mandates the imposition of civil penalties. Id. (emphasis added).
"Shall" makes the provisions to which it applies mandatory. Id. § 645.44, subd.
16.
46. Id.
47. In tort, barring certain exceptions, a percentage of the money recovered
under the suit must be used to pay attorney's fees, while the MHRA provides for the
recovery of attorney's fees. Id. § 363.071, subd. 2.
48. See Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 151, 167-73 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Remedies] (setting forth tort recovery as a
means of attaining just recovery); see also Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work
Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1463-66 (1984) ("A Title VII
plaintiff should not have to depend on the existence of favorable state tort laws in
1991]
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A battery claim addresses single instances involving physical
force.49 When an unconsented touching is part of a continual pat-
tern of harassment, a battery claim justifies compensation for dam-
ages proximately caused by the touching alone.50 The economic and
emotional harm must stem from the touching itself, not from previ-
ous or subsequent harassment.51 Consent is a defense to battery but
not to sexual harassment.52
Like battery, parallel assault claims are limited to specific acts and
the resulting, proximate harms.53 Assault, however, addresses only
order to be fully compensated for violations of rights created by the federal stat-
ute."). See generally Note, Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota: Sexual Harassment by Nonsu-
pervisoy Employees Makes Employer Liable, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 625, 627 (1981) ("The law
of intentional torts, however, has, at best, provided the victim of sexual harassment
with only a limited recovery."). But see Note, Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.: Damages for
Sexual Harassment Title VII and State Tort Law, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 657, 666 (1981) (Par-
allel tort recovery within sexual harassment actions under Title VII allows the victims
compensation for emotional damage and provides compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, all of which may be more appropriate than the reinstatement of employment
allowed under Title VII.).
In 1975, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not limit a claimant's search
for relief so as to preclude other tort remedies. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
49. Battery is intentional and unpermitted bodily contact with a person. W. KEE-
TON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 39
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (Correct inquiry
on issue of sexual harassment was whether sexual advances were unwelcome, not
whether employee's participation in them was voluntary.); see also PROSSER AND KEE-
TON, supra note 49, at 11.
Consent ordinarily bars recovery for intentional interference with person or
property. It is not, strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, but it negates the
existence of any tort in the first instance. It is a fundamental principle of the com-
mon law that volenti non fit injury-to one who is willing, no wrong is done. See id. at
112. However, in the context of a sexual harassment suit, the Supreme Court has
stated that:
The fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to
a sexual harassment suit .... The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim
is that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome" .... The correct
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sex-
ual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual
intercourse was voluntary.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
53. Assault is any act which raises an apprehension of battery. See PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 49, at 43. More specifically, a cause of action for assault requires
an intentional, unlawful offer to touch the person of another in a rude or angry man-
ner under such circumstances as to create in the mind of the party alleging the assault
a well-founded fear of an imminent battery, coupled with the apparent present ability




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 17
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/17
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
one piece of the misconduct. A regular pattern of sexual harassment
may create a hostile atmosphere without creating a reasonable ap-
prehension of imminent offensive contact. The theory of assault is,
therefore, less than completely adequate to redress harms caused by
sexual harassment.
Common law theories of intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress are well-suited for cases of sexual harassment.54
Nevertheless, a plaintiff utilizing these theories may be required to
present evidence of conduct sufficient to meet a threshold higher
than that required of claimants under the MHRA. For example, in-
fliction of emotional distress is actionable only when conduct is
deemed "extreme and outrageous." 55
54. One goal in punishing sexual harassment is protection of an individual's
peace of mind. Neither intentional nor negligent infliction of emotional distress fo-
cuses solely on physical injury. The two torts also require an examination of the
mental impact of the wrongful acts on the victim.
Development of the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
causes of action, like sexual harassment, has been fairly recent. Judicial reluctance to
develop the distress theories stemmed in part from a perceived inability to value
mental injuries: "Mental pain or anxiety . . . the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act causes that alone." PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 49, at 55 (quoting Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.C.L. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854
(1861)).
The argument that mental injury is impossible to measure, falls apart upon the
realization that" 'mental suffering is scarcely more difficult of proof, and certainly no
harder to estimate in terms of money, than the physical pain of a broken leg, which
never has been denied compensation.'" Id. "'As all pain is mental and centers in
the brain, it follows that as an element of damage ... the injured party is allowed to
recover for actual suffering of mind and body when they are the immediate and nec-
essary consequence of the negligent injury.' " Id. at 55 n.5 (quoting Hargis v. Knox-
ville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31, 33, 94 S.E. 702, 703 (1917)).
Prosser and Keeton's discussion of emotional distress includes direct reference
to the sexual harassment theory:
The work environment, for example, is one in which employees must expect
to be evaluated, not always favorably; thus questioning, criticism, and dis-
charge of an employee do not necessarily constitute [actionable intentional
infliction of emotional distress]. The work culture in some situations may
contemplate a degree of teasing and taunting that in other circumstances
might be considered [actionable]. But though the social context may make
some questionable conduct tolerable, the same social context may make
other acts especially outrageous. Sexual harassment on the job is undoubt-
edly an intentional infliction of emotional distress, for example, and harass-
ment is probably more readily found in the acts of a supervisor than in the
acts of acquaintances at a dinner party.
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 49, at 18.
55. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l., Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983).
A plaintiff must prove four elements in order to sustain an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim:
(1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless;
(3) it must cause emotional distress; and
(4) the distress must be severe.
1991]
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II. WIRIG V. KINNEY SHOE CORPORATION
A. The Facts
Margaret Wirig was employed by Kinney Shoe Corporation as a
part-time cashier in a retail store from December 1984 untilJuly 31,
1985, when she was fired.56 For approximately four months prior to
her termination, a nonsupervisory, nonmanagerial salesperson, Mark
Thorson, was employed at the same store and worked with Wirig.57
Without Wirig's consent, Thorson repeatedly patted, pinched,
kissed or put his arm around Wirig. Several co-workers and manag-
ers observed this behavior. Additionally, Thorson made statements
to and about Wirig, including "comments about her body, offensive
sexual names, repeated requests for dates with her after she ex-
pressed her refusal to date him, and discussions of what he would
like to do to her sexually."5 8
Wirig complained to several managers, asking them to stop Thor-
son's behavior. Thorson was never disciplined.59 The managers had
not been trained to recognize or handle sexual harassment. At the
time the harassment occurred, Kinney had no sexual harassment pol-
icy in effect.60
In July of 1985, Wirig and two others were publicly fired during a
special meeting of all store employees. The terminations primarily
resulted from uninvestigated allegations of theft made by Thorson.61
Id
The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the nature of outrageous conduct:
"The conduct [must be] so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment d (1965).
56. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990).
57. Id. at 376-77 (Thorson was hired in April, 1985.).
58. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 448 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
59. Id. At one point after observing him pinch or pat Wirig, an assistant manager
pushed Thorson against a storeroom wall and threatened to fire him the next time he
harassed Wirig. The assistant manager's inappropriate threats went unheeded and
Thorson's harassment of Wirig continued.
One assistant manager to whom Wirig had complained described Thorson only
as a "forward sort of guy." Id. When this assistant manager reported to a manager
that there were problems between Thorson and Wirig, the manager said: "You are
going to have to get them guys working together .... We are all a team." Id.
60. Id.
61. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 377. Thorson told a manager and two assistant manag-
ers that he had seen Wirig and two other employees steal a carload of shoes. Shortly
thereafter, that manager was transferred from the store. Thorson and the assistant
managers told the new store manager that they knew of witnesses to the theft. How-
ever, these witnesses were never identified and no investigation was ever made. The
assistant managers justified the firing with the following assertions:
1. Thorson was certain of his version of the theft;
2. Both assistant managers had heard of the theft;
[Vol. 17
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As a result of the sexual harassment and the resulting termination,
Wirig suffered physical effects connected with the ordeal for two
years following her termination.62 The trial court allowed recovery
under both the MHRA claim and the common law battery claim.63
B. The Court of Appeals'Analysis
The issue before the Minnesota Court of Appeals was whether the
MHRA precluded recovery for a common law battery claim which
was based on acts constituting sexual harassment.64 Both parties
cited the same section of the Act to support their arguments.65
Kinney argued that Minn. Stat. § 363.1166 preempted recovery
under the parallel battery claim.67 Kinney pointed to the portion of
3. The accused employees socialized together; and
4. Actual loss occurred as shown by an audit.
Id.
The firing of the accused employees was done at an employee meeting as an
example of the new manager's attitude toward short audits. Id. Subsequently, Wiig
brought a defamation claim based on her termination. Id at 376. Although signifi-
cant, the defamation claim is not the focus of this note.
62. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 529. Wirig's psychiatrist testified that she suffered from
either post-traumatic stress disorder or adjustment disorder from a depressed emo-
tional state. In addition, Wirig experienced vomiting, significant weight loss and
sleep disturbances. Id.
63. Id. at 530. The court impaneled a jury which returned special verdicts on
each claim and acted in an advisory capacity on the sexual harassment claim. Id. at
529. The jury determined the following damages:
Compensatory Damages:




Sexual Harassment $ 7,100
Punitive Damages:




The trial court determined that Kinney had a qualified privilege with respect to
the defamation claim and allowed no recovery on that claim. Id. at 530. The court
also raised the amount of punitive damages for sexual harassment to the statutory
limit of $6,000. Id. at 534. This statutory limit has since been raised to $8,500. See
MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990).
64. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 530. Kinney admitted liability for sexual harassment
and sought only to preclude recovery of battery damages. Id. at 528.
Two issues pertaining to the defamation claim were also raised on appeal: first,
whether Kinney enjoyed a qualified privilege to accuse Wirig of stealing at a store
meeting, and second, whether the $225,000 defamation damages awarded by the trial
court were excessive. Id.
65. Id. at 530-31.
66. MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1990).
67. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 530.
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that statute which reads: "[A]s to acts declared unfair by section
363.03. . . ,the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be
exclusive."68
Wirig, in turn, cited the first portion of Minn. Stat. § 363.11,
which states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in
this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the
civil rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimi-
nation because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age .... 69
The court's goal was to resolve the alleged conflict between the par-
ties' interpretations of section 363.11.70
The court looked first to the statutory definition of sexual harass-
ment.7 1 The definition encompasses sexually motivated physical con-
68. Id. at 530 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1990)) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 531 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1990)) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 530-31. Both parties argued that the intent of the legislature supported
their position. Compare Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Wiig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 448
N.W.2d 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (No. C5-89-653) (Legislature has expressly de-
clared that the MHRA's procedure shall be the exclusive procedure while pending,
for claims seeking damages for employment-related batteries of a sexual nature.) with
Brief for Respondent at 23-25, Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 448 N.W.2d 526 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (No. C5-89-653) (Statute creating a new remedy or method of enforc-
ing a right that existed before is regarded as cumulative rather than exclusive of the
previous remedies, unless an express intention to the contrary exists.).
Kinney argued that legislative intent determines whether common law and statu-
tory procedures are cumulative or if one excludes the other. Brief for Respondent at
35, Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (No. C5-89-653) (cit-
ing Mulroy v. Sioux Falls Trust & Say. Bank, 165 Minn. 295, 298, 206 N.W. 461, 463
(1925)). Specifically, Kinney argued:
A statute providing a new method for securing or enforcing an old right
does not take away or abrogate previously existing methods, unless the inten-
tion to do so is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. The
statute is regarded as giving an additional or cumulative remedy, unless it
plainly manifests an intention to make such remedy exclusive.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
Kinney argued that the Legislature has the power to declare a statutory proce-
dure exclusive, and further, that the language of section 363.11 expressed such an
intent, making MHRA procedures exclusive. Id.
In contrast, Wirig argued that "[i]n the absence of a clearly expressed intention
to the contrary, the presumption is that the legislature did not intend to change the
existing law." Brief for Appellant at 25, Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d
374 (Minn. 1990) (No. C5-89-653) (citing Claseman v. Feeney, 211 Minn. 266, 271,
300 N.W. 818, 820 (1941)). Wirig also argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court
had sanctioned common law causes of action in cases where gender discrimination
claims arise from statutorily proscribed behavior. Id. at 26 (citing Hubbard v. United
Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983)). Therefore, reasoned Wirig, since
the statute did not explicitly rule out battery claims, the claim should not be pre-
empted under the MHRA. Id. at 25.
71. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 530.
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tact72 which, the court reasoned, included battery of a sexual
nature.73 Therefore, the court held that a sexually motivated battery
occurring at a place of employment is an act declared unfair by Minn.
Stat. § 363.03.74
The court examined the distinctions between common law claims
and statutory claims under the MHRA.75 These differences, rea-
soned the court, pointed to an intent by the Legislature to treat
claims under the MHRA different from common law claims. 76 The
court rejected Wirig's attempt to "circumvent the balance"77 of the
scheme specifically created by the Legislature to handle claims under
the MHRA.
In effect, the court of appeals allowed sexually-motivated battery
to be swallowed up by the "exclusive" provisions of the MHRA when
that battery is linked to violations of the MHRA. The court ruled
that the gravamen of the complaint sounded in sexual harassment
and because Wirig's procedure under the MHRA was pending, that
procedure was exclusive, barring her parallel battery claim arising
72. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 10a (1990).
73. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 530. The court reasoned further "it is clear that the
Minnesota Human Rights Act makes it an unfair employer practice to subject an em-
ployee to battery of a sexual nature in connection with employment." Id. This rea-
soning led the court to preempt the battery claim. Id.
74. Id. The court examined the definitions of several terms in Minn. Stat.
§ 363.11 and, specifically, examined the relationship of "procedure" to "remedy."
Id. at 531. "Procedure" is the "mode of proceeding by which a legal right is en-
forced, as distinguished from the substantive law which gives or defines the right."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1203-04 (6th ed. 1990). "Remedy" is the "means by which
a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or compen-
sated." Id at 1294. "Procedure" was deemed to be interchangeable with "remedy."
See Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 531. The court found that the MHRA provided a new pro-
cedure for redress of sexual battery in the workplace, with important differences in
procedure and damages. Id. The court reasoned that since the MHRA made the
procedure exclusive, and since both common law and statutory acts provided reme-
dies, the common law claim was precluded. Id
75. Id at 531. Under the MHRA, punitive damages are capped at $8,500. MINN.
STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990). The limit for punitive damages was $6,000 when
Wirig was tried. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 531. No common law limit exists for punitive
damages. Id. Common law allows jury trials; the MHRA does not. Id. (citing MINN.
STAT. § 363.14 subd. 2 (1990)). The common law does not allow awards of attorney
fees; the MHRA does. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 363.14, subd. 3, 363.071, subd. 2
(1990)). Common law does not allow civil penalties or treble damages; the MHRA
does. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990)). The statute of limitations
under the MHRA is one year. MINN. STAT. § 363.06, subd. 3 (1990). For most com-
mon law tort claims, the limitations period is two years. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(1)
(1990).
76. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 531.
77. Id. The court saw the MHRA as a carefully crafted tool created by the legisla-
ture for dealing with complex discrimination claims. The court was hesitant to inter-
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out of the same acts which were declared unfair under the Act.78
The battery verdict and damages award were vacated. 79
C. The Supreme Court Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that battery claims may be
maintained parallel to claims under the MHRA, but refused to allow
recovery of damages under both claims. 80 The court reasoned that
elimination of employment discrimination is a goal that is not best
served by eliminating common law battery claims in sexual harass-
ment cases. 8 ' Justice Keith, writing for the court, said:
The short of it is that the prohibition of sexual harassment aims at
abolishing the pernicious societal prejudices and biases against wo-
men that impede the equal opportunity due them in our democ-
racy. For that reason, the essence of the MHRA is societal change.
Redress of individual injuries caused by discrimination is a means
of achieving that goal.
8 2
In examining the long-held presumption that statutory law is con-
sistent with common law,83 the court interpreted Minn. Stat. §
363.11 as not expressly excluding battery.84 In its effort to liberally
construe the MHRA, the court ruled that the legislature did not in-
tend for the MHRA to redress a wrong already encompassed by the
common law claim of battery. The court, therefore, held that battery
was not an act declared unfair by the statute.8 5
78. Id. at 530-31.
79. Id. Beyond the court's holding on the parallel battery claim, the court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's award of punitive damages for sexual harassment
and reversed the trial court's defamation decision by holding that Kinney had no
qualified privilege to publish the defamatory statements about Wirig. Finally, the
court of appeals decided that the trial court erred in failing to order Kinney to pay a
civil penalty to the state pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 363.14, subd. 2 and 363.071,
subd. 2. Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 536.
80. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 379 (Minn. 1990) (Plaintiff may pursue claims for sexual
harassment and/or battery, provided there is no double recovery.).
81. Id. at 378-79 (Legislature did not design the MHRA to redress intentional,
offensive, physical contact already addressed by a common law battery action.).
82. Id. at 378.
83. Id. at 377 (citing In re Shetsky, 239 Minn. 463, 469, 60 N.W.2d 40, 45
(1953)). "Statutory enactments, even though they provide new procedures to en-
force pre-existing rights .... are to be read in harmony with the existing body of law,
... unless an intention to change or repeal it is apparent." Swogger v. Taylor, 243
Minn. 458, 465, 68 N.W.2d 376, 382 (1955).
84. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 378-79. "Although under certain circumstances sexu-
ally motivated battery might fit the definition of sexual harassment, the purpose of
the MHRA does not suggest that sexually motivated battery should be impliedly ab-
rogated as an act declared unfair by the statute." Id. (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 378. The court stated: "Battery does not address discrimination. It
does not propose to redress injuries occasioned by society's discriminatory tenden-
cies. It did not develop to change society's biases or prejudices." Id.
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Despite its emphasis on liberal construction and furtherance of the
MHRA's policies, the court drastically limited the effect of parallel
battery claims. The court disallowed additional recovery for battery
when compensatory and punitive damages are awarded for harm suf-
fered as a result of both sexual harassment and battery.8 6 In order to
recover damages under both theories, the plaintiff must show, by
clear and convincing proof, that the conduct upon which battery
damages are based is different in kind than that upon which the sex-
ual harassment claim is based.87
The court found that Wirig, in recovering attorney's fees, implic-
itly chose to recover damages for sexual harassment, and not for bat-
tery. Based on this analysis, the court vacated the battery damages. 88
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that although Minn.
Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 states that those in violation of the MHRA
shall89 "pay a civil penalty to the state," 90 the amount of that penalty
is left to the discretion of the trial court.9 ' Therefore, the court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not assessing a civil
86. Id at 379. The court framed the relevant issue as the "question of whether
an employee can maintain against her employer both a statutory cause of action for
sexual harassment under the .. . [MHRA] and a common law cause of action for
battery, when both claims arise from the same set of operative facts." Id. at 377 (emphasis
added). Despite the issue set forth, the court's main focus was damages, not causes
of action.
87. Id. at 379.
88. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Wirig's argument that the bat-
tery damages were in fact damages for physical misconduct, while the statutory dam-
ages were for verbal misconduct. The court stated: "The difference in the size of the
two awards, by itself, tells us little; it may only reflect adroit trial tactics in persuading
the jury to allocate the major portion of punitive damages to the battery so as to
avoid the limitation on such damages in the sexual harassment claim." Id. (footnote
omitted).
89. See MINN. STAT. § 645.44, subd. 16 (1990) (" 'Shall' is mandatory.").
90. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 381. In actions under the MHRA, "administrative law
judges shall order any respondent found to be in violation of any provision of section
363.03 to pay a civil penalty to the state." MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990).
91. MINN. STAT. § 363.07 1, subd. 2 (1990). The court may have stepped into the
shadows when it ruled that civil penalties are not mandatory. This holding flies in the
face of clear statutory language depicting the mandatory nature of such penalties. See
generally Brief of Amicus Curiae, Minnesota Human Rights Department at 1-6, Wirig
v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (No. C5-89-653) (The Legisla-
ture clearly intended to impose a civil penalty in addition to fully adequate compen-
satory and punitive damages.).
The Legislature demonstrated its intent to distinguish civil penalty awards from
other types of damages when it stated that a judge "may ... [award] damages for
mental anguish and suffering," showing such awards to be discretionary. MINN. STAT.
§ 363.071, subd. 2 (1990) (emphasis added). In contrast, the Legislature wrote that
civil penalties "shall be awarded" when discriminatory action is found. Id. (emphasis
added).
Upon ruling that the civil penalty was discretionary, the Wirig court reasoned
that failure to impose a civil penalty was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
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penalty against Kinney. 92
III. ANALYSIS
The Wiig decision will have a dramatic impact on sexual harass-
ment litigation in Minnesota. The court of appeals decision disal-
lowing battery claims evoked an outcry from concerned parties
throughout the state. 93 These parties presented the supreme court
with amicus briefs containing well-reasoned analyses in opposition to
the court of appeals' decision.94 The Minnesota Supreme Court al-
lowed parallel battery claims, but limited their effect by disallowing
parallel damage recovery in most circumstances.
The supreme court purported to rest its decision on policy goals
which are diametrically opposed to the outcome in Wirig. The deci-
sion, at first blush, may appear to neatly mesh the terms of the
MHRA with the judicially entrenched refusal to grant double recov-
ery for a single harm,95 but a fundamental flaw fatally wounds the
The supreme court thereby reversed the court of appeal's sua sponte remand for re-
consideration of a civil penalty. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 381.
Unlike other awards, civil penalties are paid to the state. This distinction empha-
sizes the societal nature of harm caused by sexual harassment. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae, Minnesota Department of Human Rights at 4. In its brief, the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights argued for a mandatory interpretation of the civil pen-
alty clause:
Payment of a civil penalty conveys the important symbolic message that em-
ployers who engage in discriminatory acts are answerable for the harm they
inflict on the society as a whole. Moreover, payment of a civil penalty serves
to compensate the public for its support of an expensive human rights en-
forcement mechanism, which requires the time, resources, and effort of an
entire state agency, government attorneys, and the judiciary.
Id.
92. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 381-82. Although the court cited section 363.071,
subd. 2, it noted that neither party appealed the trial court's decision on this issue.
The court went on to state that "[uinder the circumstances of this case, we do not
find that the trial court abused its discretion." Id.
93. The state bar and related groups showed intense interest in the Wiig deci-
sion. Several organizations were granted leave by the supreme court to submit briefs
of amicus curiae: the Minnesota Department of Human Rights; the Women's Legal
Defense Fund; the Minnesota Chapter of the National Organization of Women
(NOW) and Les Soeurs; and the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association.
94. Each amicus brief generally supported Wirig's argument that her battery
claim should not be preempted by the act. See generally Briefs for Amicus Curiae:
Minnesota Department of Human Rights; Minnesota NOW and Les Soeurs; Minne-
sota Trial Lawyers Association; and Women's Legal Defense Fund, Wirig v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (No. C5-89-653).
95. See Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 521 (8th Cir.
1980) (vacating judgment, refusing to multiply compensatory damages by the
number of theories under which claim was asserted); Cunningham v. M--G Transp.
Serv., Inc., 527 F.2d 760, 761 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding plaintiff entitled to recover on
either theory chosen, but not on both theories); Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen,
392 N.W.2d 520, 533 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to allow double recovery when evidence
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analysis: the theories of battery and sexual harassment do not ad-
dress like injuries. Damages for sexual harassment serve to compen-
sate a victim for harm suffered as a result of discriminatory treatment
in employment. Damages for battery serve to compensate a victim
for the harm caused by interference with physical autonomy.
In a sexual harassment context, harassing and battering behavior
may blur in the eyes of those who choose not to examine the behav-
iors carefully. But upon mindful examination, the two theories
emerge as utterly distinct, independent causes of action which
should not be combined to prejudice a class already battling
prejudice.
The Wirig holding, while professing to champion the advancement
of antidiscrimination policies in Minnesota, effectively creates a
novel form of discrimination. Under Wrig, the predominantly fe-
male class of sexual harassment victims will be barred from recover-
ing the damages available to all other victims of unconsented
touching. The apparent basis for this disparate treatment is the as-
saulter's choice of weapon. If the batterer chooses sex as a weapon,
the victim's remedies will be cut short. However, if the batterer
chooses nonsexual intimidation as his weapon, the battery will be
treated as a "valid" interference with a person's autonomy, and will
be punished without the constraints of the MHRA.
The motivation behind sexual and nonsexual battery is identical.
In both instances, the aggressor seeks to intimidate and to interfere
with the victim's physical autonomy. It is unclear why the addition of
supported liability as breach of contract, common law fraud and a violation of the
Minnesota Securities Act).
In Clappier v. Flynn, the court was faced with a situation somewhat analogous to
that of the Wirig court. Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 529 (10th Cir. 1979). In
Clappier, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]he interest protected
by the common law of negligence ... parallels closely the interest protected by the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment .... Thus the
relief afforded under the common-law of torts and (42 U.S.C. §1 1983 is identical."
Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
The Clappier court held that if the defendant's liability was grounded only in neg-
ligence theory, then standard negligence damages would apply, subject to an offset
for contributory negligence. Id. at 530. Further, if the defendant was found liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only, standard damages under that act would be awarded. Id.
However, the Clappier court held that if the defendant was found to be both negligent
and in violation of section 1983, the section 1983 damages should prevail with dam-
ages in the amount allowed by that section. Id. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
higher standard of culpability under section 1983 required such an apportionment of
damages. The court assumed that section 1983 damages would be equal to or
greater than those awarded under the negligence claim. Id.
Clappier is clearly distinguishable from Wirig. In Wiig, the court was presented
with different acts which caused distinct harms, not two theories addressing the same
harm. Furthermore, any damages awarded under the MHRA will generally be lower
than those awarded under common law theories, such as battery.
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sexual content to the physical contact by the aggressor should result
in less compensation to the victim.
Apparently, the addition of sexual content by the aggressor trans-
forms the battery into "sexual harrassment." Therefore, under
Wirig, a victim's gender effectively becomes a factor in determining,
and limiting, the measure of damages. Ironically, the fundamental
purpose of the MHRA is to prevent gender from being a factor in
decisions affecting employment.
The Wiig holding turned on the interpretation of a single phrase:
"[A]s to acts declared unfair by sections 363.03 and 363.123, the
procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive."96
This phrase led the court to search for legislative intent,97 and
proper policy goals.
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the MHRA does not support the conten-
tion that Minn. Stat. § 363.11 prohibits any and all parallel tort re-
covery. The exclusivity clause relates only to the administrative
processes set out by the legislature when the statute was first en-
acted. The exclusive procedure provision has remained the same
since the predecessor to the MHRA was enacted over thirty years
ago.98 At that time, administrative hearings were the only option for
human rights claimants.99
The legislature subsequently amended the MHRA to allow parties
to bring a civil action after filing with the Human Rights Commission
96. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1988)).
97. Section 645.16 provides the following guidance for determining legislative
intent:
When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the legislature may
be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) The mischief to be remedied;
(4) The object to be attained;
(5) The former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar
subjects;
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1990).
98. Compare Minnesota State Act for Fair Employment Practices, ch. 516, § 13,
1955 Minn. Laws 802, 812 with MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1990); see also Brief for Amicus
Curiae, Minnesota NOW and Les Soeurs at 4.
99. See Minnesota State Act for Fair Employment Practices, ch. 516, § 10, 1955
Minn. Laws 802, 810 (allowing district court involvement only to review decisions by
the State Fair Employment Practices Commission, later renamed the Minnesota
Human Rights Commission) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.14 (1990)).
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and waiting at least ninety days. ° ° The exclusivity provision man-
dated an exhaustion of administrative proceedings before filing a
court action. At that time, the Legislature refused to amend the ex-
clusivity provision in Minn. Stat. § 363.11 or to allow claimants di-
rect access to the court system.l 0' This history strongly suggests
that the exclusivity provision was meant to apply to the use of admin-
istrative procedures alone. Tort claims are not specifically men-
tioned. If the legislature so intended, language regarding parallel
tort claims could have been added to the MHRA at some time during
its fifty-year existence.
More recent legislative treatment supports the above interpreta-
tions of the exclusivity provision. Of late, amendments to the MHRA
reflect an effort to aid claimants by enticing attorneys to take discrim-
ination cases and by consistently expanding available remedies
under the MHRA. Amendments to the MHRA's damages provisions
have been made to encourage private attorneys to accept discrimina-
tion cases. Attempts to limit remedies available to claimants would
stand in direct contradiction to the intent of these amendments.
In 1981, the Legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 363.14 to allow
private attorneys to bypass the Human Rights Department by bring-
ing an action directly in district courts.' 02 Hearings on this amend-
ment reflect the legislators' fears that, without monetary enticement,
private attorneys would not make use of the bypass system.'
0 3
Prompted by these fears, the Legislature amended the MHRA to al-
low awards for mental anguish and suffering and raised the limit on
punitive damages from $1,000 to $6,000.104 The limit has since
been raised to $8,500.105 In 1984, the Legislature again amended
the MHRA by allowing treble compensatory damages and attorneys'
100. Act approved May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 18, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158, 2174 (al-
lowing district court intervention after action or inaction by the Minnesota Human
Rights Commission) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.14 (1990)).
101. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, NOW and Les Soeurs at 6, (citing H.R. Journal,
68th Sess. at 1059-60 (1973) statements made by Reps. Dieterich, Kahn, Norton,
Weaver, and R. Johnson in a debate on H.R. 377 before the Minnesota House of
Representatives, 68th Session, Apr. 17, 1973)).
102. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Minnesota Department of Human Rights at 14
(citing Act approved May 29, 1981, ch. 330, § 6, 1981 Minn. Laws 1512 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.14 (1) (1990))).
103. Id. at 15 (citing Act approved Apr. 26, 1984, ch. 567, § 5, 1984 Minn. Laws
1091, 1095-96 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.071 (1990)) and Gover-
nor's Blue Ribbon Task Force on Human Rights, Report (Feb. 1984) (documenting
Department backlog and recommending increased damages to encourage private
enforcement)).
104. Act approved June 1, 1981, ch. 364, § 2, 1981 Minn. Laws 2343, 2345 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990)).
105. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990).
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fees.106 In light of these amendments and their supporting intent,
the MHRA should be interpreted as a law that supports ample dam-
age awards, not a law seeking to limit recovery.
Courts in other jurisdictions have been called upon to interpret
human rights and employment discrimination statutes and to deter-
mine whether those statutes were intended to preempt common law
claims. For example, the Wisconsin Fair Employment Acto7 classi-
fies sexual harassment as a form of employment discrimination,108
and claimants there are allowed to maintain parallel battery claims.
In Becker v. Automatic Garage Door Company,10 9 the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals recently ruled:
If a complainant alleges an act of employment discrimination...
he or she must pursue the administrative remedies through the
[Wisconsin Fair Employment Act]. On the other hand, when an
individual asserts the tort of battery, not as an act of employment
discrimination, but as an independent and unlawful touching of the
person, the mere fact that the [Wisconsin Act] defines sexual har-
assment broadly enough to include battery does not defeat the
claim. 110
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court found no language in the state
civil rights statute"'1 barring parallel tort claims for injuries arising
out of sexual misconduct.12 Courts in Illinois and the District of
Columbia have also held that state civil rights statutes do not pre-
empt common law tort claims.'13 A federal district court held that
106. Act approved Apr. 26, 1984, ch. 567, § 5, 1984 Minn. Laws 1091, 1095 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990)). Section 363.071, subd. 2
of the Minnesota Statutes currently reads:
In all cases where the administrative law judge finds that the respondent has
engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice, the administrative law judge
shall order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party, who has suffered dis-
crimination, compensatory damages in an amount up to three times the actual
damages sustained. In all cases, the administrative law judge may also order
the respondent to pay an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination,
damages for mental anguish or suffering and reasonable attorney'sfees, in addi-
tion to punitive damages in an amount not more than $8,500.
MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1990) (emphasis added).
107. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-.39 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
108. Id. §§ 111.321, 111.36.
109. 156 Wis. 2d 409, 456 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
110. Id. at 414, 456 N.W.2d at 891.
111. OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4112.01-.99 (Anderson 1991).
112. See Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 133,
543 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1989) (Employment discrimination statutes do not preempt
common law remedies for injuries arising out of sexual misconduct.).
113. Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Il. 1988) (Intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim is not preempted by Illinois Human Rights Act; total-
ity of circumstances which amounted to sexual harassment under the Human Rights
Act could also meet additional criteria necessary to amount to intentional infliction of
emotional distress.); Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc., 123 Ill. Dec. 506, 173
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certain contract-related claims are not preempted by the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act."t 4 Within the Eighth Circuit,
antidiscrimination statutes and case law reflect varying degrees of ac-
ceptance for the mixing of common law and statutory causes of ac-
tion, and administrative and civil remedies.11 5
B. The Policy Behind the Minnesota Human Rights Act
In its pursuit of policy goals, the Wing court looked to the seminal
version of the Human Rights Act, the Minnesota State Act for Fair
Employment Practices.1t 6 According to the court, the overriding
purpose of the Act is to free society from the evil of discrimination
that "threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of this
state and menaces the institution and foundations of democracy."" 1 7
The MHRA "foster[s] the employment of all individuals in this state
in accordance with their fullest capacities." ' 18 The court ruled that
the MHRA's goals of eliminating employment discrimination and es-
tablishing equal employment opportunities would not be effectuated
by the preemption of battery claims."19
A review of the statutory policy at first glance appears purely aca-
demic. Yet it is vitally important to recognize the youth of legislative
and judicial prohibitions against sexual discrimination.120 This lack
of experience necessitates legislative direction in an area vitally im-
Ill. App. 3d 953, 527 N.E.2d 1281 (1988) (Intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim not barred by Illinois Human Rights Act.); Clay v. Quartet Mfg. Co., 644 F.
Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (Tort claim premised on traditional tort principles is not
barred by Illinois Human Rights Act, even though tort occurs in an employment set-
ting.); Newman v. District of Columbia, 518 A.2d 698 (D.C. 1986) (Intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress was not injury causing disability within meaning of Merit
Personnel Act.).
114. See Pfeiffer v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 676 F. Supp. 969, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act does not preempt claims for breach of
contract or covenant of good faith and fair dealing, since such claims are not solely
dependant on age discrimination allegation.). But see Harrison v. Chance, 797 P.2d
200, 205 (Mont. 1990) (The court held that the Montana Human Rights Commission
provided the exclusive remedy for an employee's sexual harassment claims, even
though the employer's alleged acts may have provided grounds for numerous tort
claims.).
115. See generally Survey, Employment Discrimination, 11 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 1099
(1985) (overview of Eighth Circuit employment discrimination decisions from July
1984 to March 1985).
116. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 378 (citing Act approved Apr.
19, 1955, ch. 516, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 802, 803 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363.12
(1990)).
117. Id. (quoting Act approved Apr. 19, 1955, ch. 516, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 802,
803).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 378-79.
120. See generally supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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portant to the state's economic and social growth. The Legislature's
goals must be clearly enunciated and advanced. When policy is not
crystalline, it is the duty of the court to seek out goals and to advo-
cate action in compliance with those goals. Recent case history in
other jurisdictions shows that the goal of equality is not always vig-
orously pursued by the judiciary.121 It cannot be assumed that the
Legislature's struggle to promote equality will be unthinkingly cham-
pioned by the courts. For these reasons, clearly stated policy consid-
erations cannot be too greatly emphasized.
C. Battery and Sexual Harassment-Together
The supreme court correctly determined that battery was not "an
act declared unfair by sections 363.03 and 363.13."22 Since uncon-
sented touching is often only one piece of sexually harassing behav-
ior, the line drawn by the court was necessarily fine, but it was in no
way arbitrary.123 The court stated:
Battery does not address discrimination. It does not propose to
redress injuries occasioned by society's discriminatory tendencies.
It did not develop to change society's biases or prejudices.
Although under certain circumstances sexually motivated battery
might fit the definition of sexual harassment, the purpose of the
[Act] does not suggest that sexually motivated battery should be
impliedly abrogated as an act declared unfair by the statute.124
The societal/private harm distinction drawn by the Wirig court, ef-
fectively exposes an elementary difference between civil rights claims
and tort (personal injury) actions. 125 The first type of claim ad-
dresses discrimination, while the latter addresses physical interfer-
ence.1 26 The distinction between the two types of claims is critical.
121. See generally Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Sexually harass-
ing behavior is, to some extent, normal and expectable.); Come v. Bausch and Lomb,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) (Victim denied relief for harassment by super-
visor when court determined that prohibition of harassment by an "employer," as
proscribed by Title VII, did not apply to harassment by a supervisor.).
122. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 378; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 363.03, 363.13 (1990).
123. The lines drawn by the court evidence attention to the very essence of
jurisprudence:
[W]hen a new or doubtful case arises to which two different rules seem...
to be equally applicable, it ... is, the function ofjurisprudence to consider
the ultimate effect which would be produced if each rule were applied to an
indefinite number of similar cases, and to choose that rule which, when so
applied, will produce the greatest advantage to the community.
B.ACK's LAW DICTIONARY 855 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "jurisprudence").
124. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 378-79 (footnote omitted).
125. See generally Briefs for Amici Curiae, Minnesota Department of Human Rights
and Minnesota NOW and Les Soeurs, Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374
(Minn. 1990) (No. C5-89-653) (Sexual harassment is an action based on a societal
injury; it is not a personal injury claim.).
126. Compare this distinction to the one drawn by the Internal Revenue Service in
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Kinney argued: "Surely, the threat of tort liability deters wrongdoing
and encourages reasonable conduct, all to the benefit of society at
large."12 7 Even conceding this point, a distinction still remains.
Punishment for battery may benefit society, but battery is not dis-
criminatory by nature.
In their amicus brief, the Minnesota chapter of the National Or-
ganization of Women (NOW) and Les Soeurs128 argued that the very
acceptance of sexual harassment as a wrongful act stems from the
relatively novel understanding of sexual harassment not as tortious
conduct, but as evidence of social and economic inequality.129 Prior
to the adoption of antidiscrimination statutes, a victim could gain re-
dress only through tort actions.' 30 The adoption of human rights
determining the tax exemption of damages awards. Section 104 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code excludes from gross income "the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments)
on account of personal injuries or sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1990). The above
exemption is not applied "to any punitive damages in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness." Id. at § 104(a).
Minnesota courts have not specifically addressed the issue of whether damages
under the MHRA are tax exempt. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that dam-
ages awarded in discrimination actions are excludable from gross income. See gener-
ally Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989). In Byrne, the court held
that the relevant inquiry in the taxation of damages is whether the settlement was
received on account of personal or nonpersonal injuries, not whether the damages
compensated the taxpayer for economic losses. Id. at 214. Based on this reasoning,
the court excluded an entire personal injury settlement for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and wrongful discharge, finding the action "tort or tort-like" within
the gross income exclusion of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Id at 215.
The Third Circuit also allowed a complete exemption for a damage settlement of
an age discrimination suit against an employer. See Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d
655, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1990). In Thompson v. Commissioner, the court included a backpay
award in taxable income, but excluded liquidated damages in a gender discrimination
action. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989).
127. Brief for Respondent at 38, Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 374 (No. C5-89-653).
128. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Minnesota NOW and Les Soeurs at 9, Wirig, 461
N.W.2d at 374 (No. C5-89-653).
129. Id. at 10. The brief for Amicus Curiae, Minnesota NOW and Les Soeurs,
relied on Catherine MacKinnon in support of its view of the distinction as pivotal:
"The context which makes the impact of gender cumulative... is lost when
sexual harassment is approached as an individual injury, however wide the
net of damages is cast. Tort law compensates individuals for injuries while
spreading their costs and perhaps setting examples for foresightful perpe-
trators, the purpose of discrimination law is to change the society so that
this kind of injury need not and does not recur."
Id. at 10-11 (quoting FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 8, at 172-73) (emphasis
added).
130. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (D.NJ.
1976) (holding that sexual harassment was neither gender-based nor related to the
workplace, but was a personal injury which should have been pursued under a state
tort theory); see also Note, Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota: Sexual Harassment by Nonsu-
pervisoty Employees Makes Employer Liable, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 625, 627-31 (1981) (Three
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statutes evidenced an intent to distinguish between tort and discrimi-
nation theories. The flaw in the Wirig decision arises from a failure
to recognize and respond to this distinction.
It is unclear why the court so carefully articulated the distinctions
between battery and discrimination claims and then stated, "What
we have here are two legal remedies for the same wrongful conduct." 13
The court based the damage preclusion solely on precedent disal-
lowing double recovery for the same harm 32 but presented no sup-
port of damage preclusion for different injuries caused by different
acts in a similar context.
Discrimination claims differ from tort claims most clearly in regard
to the harm caused. Even if an employer battered an employee with
motivation identical to that which also produced a sexually hostile
work environment, the resulting harms would be distinct.133 If the
actions in tort have been utilized to compensate victims of sexual harassment: bat-
tery, assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.).
131. Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 379 (emphasis added).
132. One may select a remedy when more than one is appropriate to the facts, yet
a plaintiff cannot, by so doing, change the measure of recovery. 15 AM. JUR. Damages
§ 14 (1938). There cannot be double recovery for the same loss even though differ-
ent theories of liability are alleged. There is also no duplication of recovery if the
damages are awarded for separate injuries. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 35 (1988).
133. Minnesota belongs to a minority of jurisdictions in which an employer's lia-
bility for intentional torts turns on whether the tortious behavior of the harassing
employee was foreseeable, related to and connected with acts otherwise within the
scope of employment. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology,
Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982) (Question of fact existed as to whether acts
of doctor were foreseeable, related to and connected with acts otherwise within scope
of employment.); see also Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 211 N.W.2d
783 (1973) (Employer is liable for an assault by an employee when source of attack is
related to employee's duties and occurs within work-related limits of time and
place.).
Compare this limitation with the showing necessary to impute liability to an em-
ployer in a quid pro quo sexual harassment case. Section 363.01 of the Minnesota
Statutes expressly forbids a supervisor's quid pro quo harassment, without any of the
qualifying language used in the hostile environment portion of the statute. In Conti-
nental Can Co. v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted the strict liability standard
used in federal Title VII cases of quid pro quo harassment and relied on federal cases
in the court's interpretation of the MHRA. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297
N.W.2d 241, 246-48 (Minn. 1980) (Principles developed in Title VII cases are in-
structive and have been applied by this court when construing the MHRA.).
In hostile environment cases, the court will impose liability if the employer knew
or should have known of the improper conduct and failed to take timely and appro-
priate corrective action. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621
n.6 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Minneapolis Police Dep't v.
Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 425 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn. 1988).
Section 363.01, subd. 10a(3) of the Minnesota Statutes incorporates a "known or
should have known" standard directly into the definition of an offensive work envi-
ronment, and even a low-level supervisor's knowledge of the harassment has been
imputed to the employer. See, e.g., Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713,
[Vol. 17
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Wirig court's true goal was to "redress injuries occasioned by soci-
ety's discriminatory tendencies,"134 then the court should have fo-
cused its attention on those injuries rather than on a vague
contextual analysis of the aggressor's conduct. The harm occasioned
by a battery is a distinct and legitimate harm even when suffered
alongside discriminatory injuries.
D. The "Diferent in Kind" Test
The Wirig court held that battery damages may be awarded to-
gether with sexual harassment damages if the claimant shows, by
clear and convincing proof, that the misconduct on which the battery
action is based is different in kind from the misconduct on which the
sexual harassment action is based.135 The court focused on the mis-
conduct of the aggressor, not on the harm suffered by the claimant.
Application of this test will undoubtedly lead to some curious re-
sults. One may predict lines being drawn based upon where the ag-
gressor's touch landed rather than on the harm caused. Contact with
"private" body parts may be deemed discriminatory while contact
with "nonsexual" areas of the body will remain valid batteries. Thus,
we arrive at the absurd result of treating contact with "private" body
parts as less harmful, or at least less costly to the aggressor, than
contact with other parts of the body. The former will be subject to
statutory caps under the MHRA, while the latter will not.
Of course, the court may draw other lines to give meaning to the
"different in kind" test.13 6 Perhaps a battery will no longer give rise
to a valid claim for damages when it occurs near in time or location
to sexual harassment. Does battery become unbefitting of punish-
ment if it occurs in conjunction with discrimination? These unnatu-
715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (Liquipak knew or should have known of offensive envi-
ronment harassment because harasser was a supervisory employee.); Bersie v. Zycad
Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (One harasser was a supervisor,
the other an executive.); McNabb v. Cub Foods, 352 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1984)
(First level supervisor's knowledge imputed to employer.); Clark v. K-Mart Store
#3059, 372 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Harassment by first-level assis-
tant manager imputed to the employer.).
134. Wiig, 461 N.W.2d at 378.
135. Id. at 379.
136. The "different in kind" test may have more impact than any other portion of
the decision. Future claimants and their attorneys will undoubtedly grapple with the
boundaries of the test and will strive to meet its requirements whenever improper
physical conduct is alleged.
A battery claim parallel to a harassment claim will be unlike an ordinary battery
claim. The claimant will need to show the usual elements of unwanted bodily con-
tact, harm and damages as well as evidence that some specific instance of unwanted
contact arose in a context or from motivation other than that of the claimed harass-
ment. This additional burden may prove especially heavy since the "different in
kind" test may require a showing of the aggressor's motivation.
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ral parameters threaten to swallow up any battery suffered in an
environment found to be "hostile" under the MHRA. Such a wide-
sweeping application of the "different in kind" test would deprive
numerous claimants of redress for harm caused not by a hostile envi-
ronment, but by battery itself.
If the court had chosen to focus on the individual harms caused by
discrimination and by battery, the "different in kind" test would be
entirely unnecessary. With harm as the focus, as in all litigation in-
volving multiple claims, counsel may present proof of the distinct
harm caused by each wrongful act. Determining the amount and ba-
ses of damages is uniquely the province of the trier of fact. The
court proffered no reason why trial courts cannot make such deter-
minations in sexual harassment and battery cases. The victim would
be compensated for each harm. Without harm, there would be no
compensation. Claimants like Wirig would be awarded battery dam-
ages proximately related to the touching itself and damages under
the MHRA for harm caused by the discrimination. No double recov-
ery would be granted.
E. The Effect of Wirig on Parallel Tort Claims
How Wirig will affect damage recovery under parallel assault, in-
fliction of emotional distress or other tort claims remains to be
seen.' 3 7 The similar nature of these and battery claims certainly sug-
gests similar treatment. In fact, it may now be more difficult to main-
tain parallel assault and emotional distress claims than parallel
battery claims.
Assault and emotional distress claims are similar in nature to sex-
ual harassment claims. The gravamen of each is not necessarily a
specifically enumerated concrete act, but the motivation behind that
act and its result. Proof that the tortious acts were different in kind
from the harassment acts may be extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to produce.
Victims may be hard pressed to present clear and convincing evi-
dence showing that an actor on one occasion acted so as to create a
hostile work environment, and yet on another occasion acted to cre-
ate an apprehension of imminent bodily harm so as to cause severe
emotional distress. The physical act of a battery may provide a
clearer window into the actor's motivation-an element made impor-
137. In Wirig, the court implicitly found Wirig's defamation claim to meet the re-
quirements of the "different in kind" test and allowed damage recovery. Id. at 381.
Such a result cannot be expected for all defamation claims raised parallel to sexual
harassment claims. Applying Wirig, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently refused
recovery for a defamation claim brought with a sexual harassment action. See
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tant by the "different in kind" test. A pat on the buttocks, for exam-
ple, apparently denotes an intent different from that of a left hook to
the jaw. It may be more difficult to show that comments threatening
physical harm are different in kind from an expression of what an
actor would like to do to a victim sexually. Distinctions may turn on
the sexual nature of offensive comments. Wirig did not expressly
preclude damages for parallel tort claims, but the decision will prob-
ably implicitly curb such awards.
F. The Practical Effect of Wirig on Sexual Harassment Litigation
The practical effect of Wirig remains to be seen. The decision may
prompt exercises in creative pleading, changes in the MHRA, lower
damage awards or a short-term rise in parallel tort claims other than
battery.
It is reasonable to expect a flurry of dubious pleading efforts as
litigators attempt to determine the boundaries of the Wirig holding.
One possible ramification is a greater emphasis on parallel torts
other than battery. Plaintiffs' attorneys who are determined to over-
ride the damage limitations of the MHRA may, in certain circum-
stances, rely on assault, emotional distress and other tort claims.138
Without guidance from appellate courts and despite Wirig, trial
courts may allow such claims. Certain fact situations may even com-
pel plaintiffs to forego actions under the MHRA in favor of autono-
mous tort claims. In any event, pleadings will necessarily contain
facts focused on the separate nature of tortious acts when parallel
claims are raised.
Wirig may compel legislative change. Without parallel damages
(battery or otherwise), there may be an overall drop in sexual harass-
ment awards. Lower overall recovery would undoubtedly spur de-
bate about whether MHRA damage limitations should again be
raised. Such debate is fitting. Legislative history reveals that the
Legislature intended the MHRA to be a plenary procedure for sexual
harassment adjudication. If the Legislature approves the Wirig
court's interpretation of this act of battery as synonymous with a
claim of sexual harassment deemed unlawful by the MHRA, then it
must scrutinize the consequences of the MHRA's application, and it
must raise statutory damage caps. Without the Legislature as a vigi-
lant monitor of its creation, courts will have difficulty finding justice
in its application. Healthy debate should impel necessary change.
138. In the future, it will be interesting to see Wirig's effect on discrimination
claims other than sexual harassment. The Wirig court's broad interpretation of the
MHRA may result in changes in the treatment of the many other types of discrimina-
tion covered by the MHRA.
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CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Human Rights Act was not designed to redress
personal injuries occasioned by battery suffered in the workplace.
The MHRA allows employees to secure relief from discriminatory
employment practices; whereas, common law battery theory seeks to
compensate victims for intrusion upon physical autonomy. Yet, the
Wing court held that when battery and sexual harassment arise in the
same context, only one recovery is warranted.
The Wirig holding generates an absurd result. Although the court
gave lip service to the policy of furthering a sexual harassment vic-
tim's search for relief, it pulled the rug out from under claimants
seeking complete recovery for all harms suffered. If the court truly
wished to champion the cause of discrimination victims, it would
have recognized the independent nature of battery and sexual har-
assment theories by awarding separate damages for each.
Joan Fluegel
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